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Abstract
Discussing Foucault’s and Deleuze’s work on meaning-making, the article argues that we might make better use of the in-
tersubjectivity of a meaning when interpreting emotions. Interpreting emotions in texts remains complicated because dis-
cussion on the ontological character of emotions sustains an opposition of emotion to meaning structures. Both Foucault
and Deleuze conceive meaning-making through permanent oscillation between the subjective accounts of a meaning and
its collective interpretation. These two dimensions are not in conflict but create meaning through their interdependence.
On the basis of this interdependence, we can conceive of an interpretive analysis of emotions as a way to study language
means that label particular emotions as relevant, legitimized, or useful. This shift of the debate on emotions away from
what emotions are and toward what they mean enhances the critical shape of interpretive analysis of emotions because
it uncovers conflicts hidden behind the veil of allegedly neutral policy instruments.
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1. Introduction
Despite a growing consensus in political science that
emotions help us make sense of politics (see e.g., Clarke,
Hoggett, & Thompson, 2006; Hunter, 2015; Jupp, Pykett,
& Smith, 2016), a heated discussion still prevails over
the ontological character of emotions. This discussion
mainly concerns whether emotions are ‘subjective’, ‘indi-
vidual’, or ‘collective’ practices, whether they are framed
through bodily responses or are socio-politically and his-
torically contingent (see the overview of the debate in
Clément & Sangar, 2018). This large body of thought has
an impact on the way the interpretation of emotions
has been conceived in the analysis of politics. Scholarly
works that analyze policies—workingmostly with textual
data (such as policy documents, parliamentary debates,
transcripts of interviews, etc.)—have approached emo-
tions in one of two ways. One approach considers ‘emo-
tions’ as expressions of feelings and affects that are in-
congruous to meaning structures because of their bod-
ily and sensual character, their unpredictability. This has
been the main focus of the affective turn that loosely
echoes Gilles Deleuze (Brennan, 2004; Clough & Halley,
2007). The other approach identifies emotions as a sort
of pre-stage to meaning, as a raw energy or individ-
ual agency that must be inscribed in the meaning struc-
ture (Glynos, 2008; Norval, 2009). This approach was ad-
vancedmainly by poststructuralist political theory, which
built on Michel Foucault (for Foucauldian discourse anal-
ysis see also Delori, 2018) and other theorists.
The present article affixes the rich discussion on emo-
tions in politics to the issue of the interpretation of emo-
tions. It argues that an intersubjective notion of mean-
ing is needed to understand how emotions become part
of meaning and how these meanings are transmitted
through textual data for analysis in policy debates. This
notion of meaning is conceptualized here through the
discussion of Foucault’s and Deleuze’s work on mean-
ing (Deleuze, 1968, 1975, 1978; Foucault, 1966, 1969a,
1971). Both Foucault and Deleuze provide conceptual
tools for us to think about such an intersubjective notion
because they see meaning-making as an intersubjective
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activity that is produced and reproduced through inter-
dependence between the subjectively expressed or ar-
ticulated meanings and their inscription in patterns of
collective interpretations. The article thus shows how
the authors’ mediating interest in this interdependence
proposes epistemological groundings for an interpretive
analysis of emotions (for the role of both authors for ana-
lyzing politics see Brass, 2000; Dean, 2010; Edkins, 2014;
Howarth, 2002; Lövbrand & Stripple, 2015; Patton, 2000;
Rabinow, 1991; Zevnik, 2016).
The article begins with an overview of how the turn
to emotions in social sciences has enabled a distinct
focus on knowledge in policy studies. It shows then
that while operationalizations of knowledge have been
proposed in policy studies (Fischer & Forester, 1993;
Fischer, Torgerson, Durnová, & Orsini, 2015; Schwartz-
Shea & Yanow, 2013; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 1996),
theseworks have not clarified the role of emotion in such
analysis (see the critique also in Durnová, 2015). The in-
terdependence of the subjective and collective dimen-
sions of a meaning-making conceived by Foucault and
Deleuze enables us to understand emotions as evaluat-
ing and value-loaded references to articulations of emo-
tions that frame policy debate, giving legitimacy to some
actors while silencing other actors by labeling them as
‘emotional’. The interpretive analysis of emotions has the
advantage of depicting concrete languagemeans by that
these references to emotions are displayed. The article
concludes by providing examples of how such an inter-
pretive analysis of emotions can be set up. It follows
that this article does not aim to provide yet another site
for discussing the ontological character of emotions, nor
does it endeavor to resolve the dilemmas between the
cognitive and representational nature of emotions that
those discussions imply (as discussed, e.g., in Barbalet,
2002; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990). Rather, it proposes
epistemological groundings for identifying emotions in
textual data, which can be used not just in policy studies
but in any social analysis of knowledge.
2. Emotions as Intersubjective Elements of
Meaning-Making
A diversified and somewhat antagonistic set of ap-
proaches has been deployed to understand emotions
in politics, which has elevated the debate on the onto-
logical character of emotions to prominence (see the
review works on the topic, e.g., Berezin, 2009; Dixon,
2012; Jasper, 2011). It was deemed necessary to reflect
on what emotions are in order to identify where emo-
tions can be found and how they can help us to un-
derstand political phenomena better. In policy studies,
mainstream research first resisted including emotions in
its analytical toolkit, which has been emphasized mainly
by Thompson and Hoggett (2001), van Stokkom (2005),
and Newman (2012) in their critique of deliberation as
an enterprise that excludes citizen groups, and knowl-
edge on the basis of their emotionality. The critique
of deliberation was part of larger paradigmatic fram-
ings of emotions in sociology and political theory, which
defined them as socio-historically contingent practices
(Ahmed, 2013; Hochschild, 2003; Zelizer, 2005). This de-
bate helped scholars in policy studies conceptualize emo-
tions as elements of knowledge framing policies and ac-
tors that discuss them and/or formulate them (Hunter,
2015; Jupp et al., 2016). Referring to emotions and em-
phasizing emotions of actors are then practices under-
stood as revealing the socio-political hierarchy that af-
fects what knowledge is seen as legitimate and which ac-
tors are seen as relevant. This perspective was set up to
explain how emotions are used in policy debates to ad-
vance particular types of knowledge (see the example of
the public debate on AIDS in Gould, 2009; and the ex-
ample of the public debate on care in Durnová, 2013).
While focusing on the use of knowledge, and the con-
texts of this use, works in policy studies have shown how
emotions frame the identities of policy receivers through
these uses of knowledge (Clarke, 2006; Hunter, 2003).
These approaches have highlighted that emotions en-
ter as evaluative components of policies (Greene, 2002;
Orsini & Smith, 2010; Stenner & Taylor, 2008) and that
the emotional lens helps scholars understand the val-
ues behind policies, which may otherwise be hidden be-
hind the notion of a neutral policy instrument. How ac-
tors evaluate a particular policy issue against their feel-
ings about that issue shapes what they do and which ar-
guments and symbols they deploy in their actions (see
the examples in family policies in Durnová & Hejzlarová,
2017; Jupp, 2017).
At the same time, all these works showed that emo-
tions are used in the analysis of policies as contingent
practices. This perspective positions them close to works
in social geography that stress that emotions are ‘embed-
ded knowledge’ (Bondi, 2014) and ‘narrations’ of prob-
lems (Czarniawska, 2015). Identifying emotions through
their aspect of socially inscribed and collectively orga-
nized contingency is also the main strand of sociology of
emotions working with qualitative data (Flam & Kleres,
2015) as well as in IR works (Koschut, 2018). Recent In-
ternational Relations works take up such contingency, fo-
cusing on why specific emotions become relevant in par-
ticular situations (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014). As shows
for example Ty Solomon (Holland & Solomon, 2014;
Solomon, 2011), the analysis of emotional phenomena
should focus on the interdependence between individ-
ual agencies and their inscription in these contingent
practices. All these processes of socially and collectively
organized inscription, regardless of whether they are
described in the different social scientific disciplines as
norms, rules, practices, or rituals, share the perspective
that emotions are endowed with meanings and that, in
order to understand their role in politics, we must inter-
pret them.
However, the focus on the interpretation of policies
has not automatically produced an inclusion of emotions.
Interpretive works in policy studies focused on how polit-
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ical phenomena have meaning (Yanow, 1996) and how
we can understand politics better through interpreta-
tion (Wagenaar, 2011). They were focusing on language
and meaning-making practices as practices coproducing
the way problems are framed and understood as such
(Fischer, 2003; Griggs & Howarth, 2004; Yanow& van der
Haar, 2013). In doing so, these works have highlighted
the role of ‘arguments’ (Fischer &Gottweis, 2012) or ‘nar-
ratives’ (Lejano & Leong, 2012) as language strategies
that enable us to see the ‘political process’ behind the for-
mulation or implementation of policies (Zittoun, 2014).
These approaches have had a somewhat complicated re-
lationship with emotions. On the one hand, some inter-
pretive works have evoked the issue of emotions more in
the sense of ‘showing emotions’ (Fischer, 2009; Gottweis
& Prainsack, 2006) rather than interpreting their con-
tingency. Other works have analyzed how the presence
of emotions in policy processes enrolls a novel dynamic
in policy negotiations (Verhoeven & Duyvendak, 2016).
On the other hand, interpretive concepts such as ‘argu-
ments’, ‘narratives’, and ‘discourses’ have developed into
rationalizing meaning structures. This resulted in view-
ing the analysis of emotion in policies as a pre-stage to
the analysis of meanings (see the conceptualization of af-
fects in poststructuralist policy analysis in Glynos, 2008)
or even opposed to it. An example that illustrates this op-
position is scholarly work that analyzes feeling and per-
formance in policy work; that perspective views the anal-
ysis of emotions as an antipode to the interpretive char-
acter of analysis (Anderson, 2017).
This article proposes solving this complicated rela-
tion of meanings to emotions by investigating more
deeply the notion of ‘meaning’. Analyzing policies and
policy debates comprehends all manner of textual data:
documents, media articles, and parliamentary debates,
inquiry transcripts, but also field notes and notes from
(participatory) observation. All these data are meaning-
ful; they are conferred meaning by a variety of actors en-
tering the policy debate. This makes ‘meaning’ a central
unit of interpretation of policies. Returning to Foucault
and Deleuze and their work on meaning proposes an
epistemological grounding to argue for an ‘intersubjec-
tive’ notion of meaning. In its linguistic conception, in-
tersubjectivity is the very condition of verbal interac-
tion because it brings the subjective intentions of saying
something together with the collective understandings
of these sayings (used in different sorts of textual analy-
sis such asMaingueneau, 2014). Understanding the inter-
subjectivity in the analysis of policies enables us to over-
come the complicated relation between the interpreta-
tion of meanings and the analysis of emotions because it
suggests that meaning is a result of interdependence be-
tween the subjective expression (moment, feeling, point
of view) and its collective validation (socio-cultural con-
tingency, path dependency, the established institutional
practice). Making this interdependence central for inter-
pretation allows the focus to shift from ‘emotions’ to
particular discursive registers through which some refer-
ences to emotions become legitimized in policy discus-
sions while others are disregarded or even disqualified
as illegitimate or ‘too emotional’. This move from what
emotions are toward what theymean enhances the criti-
cal shape of analysis. Itmakes visible the languagemeans
by which voices are silenced in a policy debate based on
their alleged emotionality asmuch as it renders germane
the conflicts hidden behind the veil of ‘neutral’ knowl-
edge or policy instruments.
3. Understanding Intersubjectivity through Foucault
and Deleuze
Reflections on meaning-making of Foucault and Deleuze
are used here as a pathway to propose epistemologi-
cal groundings for conceiving of textual data as reveal-
ing the intersubjectivity of meanings. Viewing through
the lens of intersubjectivity enables us to conceive an in-
terpretation of emotions in these textual data. Both au-
thors reflect in their work that texts are full of fluctuation
between ‘classified’ semantic categories and ‘volatile’
rhetorical devices that challenge these categories. Text
can subsequently be seen as an oscillation between
‘structured’ narrations of events, which bring forward
established and codified genres, and ‘subjective’ narra-
tions that challenge these genres. Both thinkers empha-
size that the meaning of an event is negotiated through
subjective accounts of a meaning and the multiplicity
of other meanings that could be used to describe such
an event. Both authors assert that a necessary part of a
meaning is the constant aspiration toward a certain type
of codification. Even though subjective accounts are im-
portant, without this codification, meaning would not be
understood by others. What diverges in the perspective
of both authors is the focus on the codification procedure
in Foucault (1966, 1969b) and the focus on the possibility
of disturbing this codification in Deleuze (1968, 1978).
This focus on codification turns us first to ‘discourse’,
Michel Foucault’s key term. Discourse, for Foucault,
presents a link between thought and the ‘culture of
thought’, which presents, represents, articulates, and
classifies meanings. The turn to discourse makes us at-
tentive to meanings not as surplus decorations of polit-
ical actions but as actions themselves that shape and
coproduce what policy actors do. Discourse reveals the
link between power and knowledge (see e.g., Fischer
et al., 2015; Lövbrand & Stripple, 2015). Foucault defines
power as an instance governing through—and govern-
ing of—a constantly developing knowledge (1966, 1969b,
see also in 2009), which has given interpretivists’ epis-
temological grounds to think of policies through mean-
ings, texts, symbols, or arguments. For that reason, in-
terpretivists analyze registers of knowledge that estab-
lish a hierarchy of what counts as valuable or legiti-
mate, an idea advanced mainly in Foucault’s The Order
of Things (1969b).
Second, there is always the possibility of a change
of a discourse. Discourse, albeit coding the collective, in-
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teracts constantly with subjects using it. Foucault’s em-
phasis on taxonomies, which order our subjective expe-
riences tomake themmeaningful collective phenomena,
represents one such interaction. Taxonomies reveal to
us the dangerous mixing of elements within a language,
which codifies our practices. If observed from a compar-
ative perspective of different cultures, or from a perspec-
tive of diversified subjective experiences, as we can see
in contested policy issues, the analysis has to pay atten-
tion to how the subject acquires the knowledge, and how
she interiorizes it by both confirming it and rejecting it.
Studying fractures in a discourse, thereby searching to
conceptualize how to deal with multiplicity or contesta-
tion, has become pressing in policy inquiry, especially in
times of plurality of knowledge and in times of ambiva-
lent hierarchies in increasingly globalized and networked
democracies. Someworks in the interpretation of politics
have thus suggested turning away from meaning struc-
tures to dramaturgy (Hajer, 2005) or to physical perfor-
mances (Edkins, 2015) and the staging of events, refer-
ring explicitly to Deleuze (Lundborg, 2009).
That we constantly run the risk of repressing the
subjective meaning of an event through some codify-
ing mechanism is essential to the Deleuzian notion of
meaning-making (Deleuze, 1968, 1975). However, in-
stead of staying within the ‘subjective’, or the ‘affective’,
Deleuze proposes focusing on the tensions that emerge
between the subjective and collective dimensions of
meaning. Deleuze describes a subject’s role in meaning
as both a producer and a suppressed object of a collec-
tive semantic boundary (1977, 1978; see also Deleuze &
Guattari, 1972). To be attentive to a subjective shaping
of knowledge, and to tensions that might result, is part
of his idea of ‘difference’ (Deleuze, 1968). Through dif-
ference, Deleuze conceives the possibilities the subject
has to emancipate herself from her discourse. The poten-
tiality of being outside a structure gives a possibility that
the discourse might change, that power relations might
be subverted or that peripheral meanings might move to
the center. This movement beyond, ‘devenir’ in the lan-
guage of Deleuze (1988), is conceived positively as a con-
tinual emancipation from all sorts of ‘repression mecha-
nisms’ that try to restrict the subject in rigid formats. Be-
yond this, it also serves as a critical alert for analysts that
their toolkits and theories can also develop into ‘repres-
sion mechanisms’. Deleuze ties this risk to schemes of
language such as ‘explanation’, ‘analysis’, and ‘interpre-
tation’, which by seizing the manifold and rich reservoir
of experience may become oppressive.
This view allows Deleuze at the same time to con-
ceive meaning not as a compact category but as a con-
stant possibility of disturbance (Deleuze, 1968). Irony,
joking, and misunderstanding are semantic figures that
per definition escape any order of discourse, but without
this escaping they would not make any sense (Deleuze,
1977, p. 143). Deleuze thus pits the idea of an event
against ‘the potentiality of an event’ because the po-
tentiality explicitly entails tensions and possibilities of
re-codification (Deleuze, 1988, p. 8). At the same time,
Foucault does not abandon the individual mechanisms
by which power is exercised, either. What rises as the
important point for the study of a discourse is that, in
Foucault’s view, the subject adopts certain practices, re-
jects them, revises them, or becomes emancipated from
them. Discourse and identity are inextricably linked (see
also Foucault, 2008). The subject coproduces power by
making these practices ‘normal’, ‘rational’, or ‘legitimate’
(Foucault, 1988, pp. 26-33). In The Order of Discourse,
Foucault (1971) uses the disturbance, the eventual con-
tradiction, to illustrate his emphasis on the order and his
fascination with it. This can be seen also in his foreword
to The Order of Things, where he explains how Borges’s
anecdote on the Chinese encyclopedia made him laugh,
because it creates an order by placing together totally dif-
ferent elements (Foucault, 1966). He describes his laugh-
ter as the ‘impossibility to think something’ and it be-
comes an important epistemological category for the
subsequent codification of meanings.
What is central for the conceptualization of inter-
subjectivity is that both authors point toward the inter-
dependence between the subjective (instant) and the
collective (codified): Foucault uses ‘this impossibility to
think’ to explain that discourse has the power to ‘speak
truth’, to give meaning to events and problems and to
codify these meanings in a long-term perspective. Dis-
course achieves this because it codifies this impossibil-
ity of thinking in categories, practices, rules, and norms.
These categoriesmight be inaccurate for grasping subjec-
tive accounts, but the codification comprises also this in-
accuracy. An example of this can be found in the verbal
interaction in which we state that we know that some-
thing is difficult to describe, but then we describe it any-
way. The difficulty of describing is the lens that Deleuze
applies to deal with the interdependence. Deleuze uses
the same ‘impossibility of thinking’ to explain that dis-
course cannot speak truth to power, nor can it coin the
meaning of an event, because its power is constantly
disturbed by the multiple subjective accounts of mean-
ings (Deleuze, 1968), by inaccuracies, jokes, ironical state-
ments, or even silence. But again, these rhetorical de-
vices can function only in their relation to the codifica-
tion, no matter how much we might feel oppressed by
this structure when articulating the subjective meaning
of an event.
Both authors cite the larger implications of this inter-
dependence for social analysis: the context of modern
rationality has made structures and norms and codes its
ultimate device for organizing citizens into societies. The
oscillation between organized codification and disorga-
nized subjective accounts ofmeanings iswhat drives pub-
lic debates on an issue. There are codified practices that
become contested, disrupted, and challenged in the de-
bate in order to become the new codification. From one
perspective of the debate, these practices can be seen
as ‘codified’, while from another perspective they are
seen as ‘disturbing’. Taking this oscillation into account
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means that we cannot stand outside of a discourse; we
are always within discourse, as debaters or as analysts
(Foucault & Deleuze, 1972). Deleuze suggests in Nomad
Thought (1978) that it is possible to overcome this con-
stellation by embracingmultiplicity. One of the examples
he uses is the spread of psychoanalysis in France in the
1970s, which he also articulates together with Guattari
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1972). Deleuze’s reproach of the ris-
ing fashion of psychoanalysis was that—albeit searching
to understand the wild subconscious—it alienated the
subject through the codified analytic structure of psy-
choanalytic therapy. The main impetus of this critique
was to uncover how intellectual positions that might
understand themselves as ‘critical’ and ‘innovative’ or
even ‘revolutionary’—and in France the group advancing
Freudian thinking was one such reference for them—run
the risk of becoming just another new ‘repression mech-
anism’. Deleuze was afraid that the focus on the analyt-
ical framing might reduce the multiplicity of meanings
and the possibilities of becoming something else (Backes-
Clement, 1976).
4. Embracing Emotions through Interpretation
Policy studies offer examples that enable setting up an
interpretive analysis of emotions that takes advantage
of the intersubjective notion of meaning. Maarten Hajer
(2005), for example, shows in his analysis of the post-
9/11 re-building process of Ground Zero in New York City
the role of contradictory emotions for policy planning, al-
though he does not discuss implications for respective
analysis of emotions. Contradicting views of property
owners, family members of victims, and New York resi-
dents were all meaningful parts of the decision-making
process around the re-building of the site. All these sub-
jective assessments of the event played some part in the
city’s mourning process over 9/11, yet they did not enjoy
the same level of recognition during the decision-making
process. The dramaturgy to stage a particular narrative
of the re-building process in fact employed meaning-
making procedures to bring forward some emotions ex-
pressed during the planning process as the ‘important’
or ‘legitimate’ ones. An interpretive analysis of emotions
could study these particular staging further by examining
the verbal interactions among actors and arguments in
policy papers to identify how these particular emotions
were referenced, how they were brought into relation
with the events of 9/11 andwith the aim of a ‘re-building
process’, and how, on that basis, they might be framed
as ‘emotional’, which subsequently legitimized their ex-
clusion from the process. Interpretive analysis of emo-
tions can also uncover the hidden conflict around the
paradigmatic framing of a planning process that—by con-
ceiving of a policy design as a rational enterprise—allows
only certain experiences to become a legitimate part of
the discussion.
A second example is the issue of alimony policy,
which shows how the subjective meanings of ‘single
motherhood’ are diffused by the respective policy design
(see the analysis in Durnová & Hejzlarová, 2017). That
single mothers don’t feel ‘happy’ and that they are ‘frus-
trated’ are excluded from the design of alimony because
these are too emotional to be included in a policy. Subjec-
tive assessment of the policy is seen simply as part of the
cost-benefit analysis because policies—as policy studies
have taught us (May, 2012)—are always reductionist and
therefore have winners and losers. Interpreting concrete
references to emotions, such as references to a ‘frus-
trated mother’, enables those who argue for the policy
design to disqualify these voices from a debate that is la-
beled as ‘serious’ because it is about ‘real’ financial costs
and not about ‘sentiments’. A third example of interpre-
tive analysis is the end-of-life controversy (analyzed in
Durnová, 2018). Every end-of-life policy, regardless of
whether it is for or against self-chosen death, is inter-
twined with the diversified, and often ambivalent, sub-
jective experience that each of us might have with the
end of life. Any end-of-life policy oriented toward elab-
orating a concrete choice will in fact exclude other sub-
jective experiences. Interpretive analysis of emotions, in
this case, can look at how emotions are referenced in par-
ticular situations and how some of them become legit-
imized as ‘understandable’ while other emotions are not
legitimized and instead are described as ‘irrational’ and
the people who hold them as ‘not really meaning it’. The
analysis can then look behind the ethical debate on this
issue to show that these ethical positions are sustained
through references to emotions.
Setting up an interpretive analysis of emotions
means identifying discursive registers through which
emotions are articulated and shared because they are
seen as legitimate or relevant, while other emotions are
not acknowledged as either relevant or legitimate. Such
identification means explaining through which concrete
means these registers hold together, what challenges
them, and what consolidates them. By revealing these
registers, the interpretive analysis of emotions finally en-
hances the critical shape of policy inquiry: it allows those
who are silenced by the paradigmatic framing of valu-
ing political rationality over emotions to be heard. An-
alyzing the language means through which those com-
plaining about a policy design are silenced can become
a way to uncover the larger dichotomization of politics
opposing arguments presented as ‘rational’, against ar-
guments presented as emotions of ‘strainedmothers’, or
‘unhappy citizens’ and ‘suffering patients’. Making this di-
chotomization visible through an analysis of concrete ref-
erences to emotions in a policy debate enables to iden-
tify the normative dimension lying behind the alleged
neutrality of policy knowledge and policy instruments.
5. Conclusion
While analyses of political phenomena have paid atten-
tion to emotions through multiple approaches, viewing
emotions as a ‘necessary disequilibrium’ (Berezin, 2009)
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opposed to structured knowledge has persisted in the
field. This limitation has also affected interpretation of
policies. As I have demonstrated through discussion of
the interpretative approaches to policy studies, emo-
tions have been treated as elements with a special status
or, as, Foucault put it, as ‘impossible to think’. They have
been seen as ‘disruptions’, as Deleuze holds about the
role of the subjective accounts of meanings. In treating
Foucault and Deleuze as the two main sources of inspira-
tion for interpretation, the article proposes an outline for
an epistemological framework for an intersubjective no-
tion of a meaning. Emotions can be analyzed in terms of
what they mean to whom without losing their aspect of
disruptive elements that challenge those meanings. Em-
phasizing the interdependence between subjective ac-
counts of meanings and their validation through collec-
tive understandings (socio-cultural contingency, path de-
pendency, historical contingency) gives an epistemolog-
ical grounding to understand that meaning is intersub-
jective, and the oscillation between subjective accounts
and collective understanding is part of this. It also en-
ables us to shift the discussion on emotions in social sci-
ence away from what emotions are toward what they
mean in a concrete policy debate and how they are used
to design policies as much as they expose these policies
to contestation.
The examples cited, along with the discussion on
meaning in Foucault and Deleuze, permit us to draw a
pathway toward the interpretive analysis of emotions.
Looking for emotions as they can be found in the tex-
tual data can identify contradictions and misunderstand-
ing once we treat these texts, as Foucault and Deleuze
suggest, as a site for negotiation between what the sub-
ject says or does and how that is understood by the col-
lective and subsequently framed in policy debates. Emo-
tions are not opposed to meanings: they play with them,
and sometimes against them. Emotions are inscribed in
cultural or societal contingencies, underpinning actors’
motivations to participate, while simultaneously enact-
ing changes in contexts and actors in the policy process.
Emotions both consolidate and challenge policies: they
‘negotiate’withmeaningswhile being simultaneously ne-
gotiated by them.
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